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Introduction
During the past two decades, an important new method of financing large-scale, high-risk domestic and international business ventures has emerged. This technology, called project finance, is usually defined as limited or non-recourse financing of a newly to be developed project through the establishment of a vehicle company (separate incorporation). Thus the distinguishing features of project finance (PF) are, first, that creditors share much of the venture's business risk and, second, that funding is obtained strictly for the project itself without an expectation that the corporate or government sponsor will co-insure the project's debt--at least not fully.
Project finance was first used on a large scale to develop the North Sea oil fields during the 1970s, where the scale and risk of the investment required far exceeded the capabilities of any single petroleum company, or even any single consortium of companies.
1 Following the success of the North Sea developments, PF has been used extensively to develop natural resource, electric power, transportation, and numerous other ventures around the world. PF has been associated with many financial and operating success stories. These include the Teeside Power project in the UK, the Ras Laffan LNG project in Qatar, the Hopewell Partners Guangzhou Highway in southern China, and the Petrozuata heavy oil project in Venezuela (see Esty and Millett (1998) ), as well as numerous independent power generation projects in the United
States. However, PF is most closely associated in the public mind with three spectacular recent financial failures--the Channel Tunnel (Eurotunnel), the EuroDisney theme park outside of Paris, and the Dabhol power project in India. In spite of these failures, total PF lending worldwide has exceeded $36 billion every year since 1989, and reached a peak of $85 billion in 1997 before dropping back to $54 billion during the 1 If project finance is defined more generally as limited recourse financing of stand-alone projects, Kensinger and Martin (1988) quite rightly point out that this financing technique predates stocks or bonds by several centuries. The "modern" form of PF--using a separately-incorporated vehicle company (governed by British or U.S. commercial law), syndicated loan financing, and sophisticated contractual allocation of project risks and responsibilities-is, however, a much more recent invention.
following year's global economic turmoil.
Given its increasing importance as a funding vehicle, it is not surprising that PF has attracted a great deal of academic interest, though the vast majority of published articles and working papers are theoretical rather than empirical studies. The financial packages themselves offer rich opportunities for testing core financial theories using a sample of large, self-contained financial contracts that must both allocate risk and solve basic agency problems between sponsors and creditors. Several theoretical studies examine the characteristic "separate incorporation" feature of project finance. Shah and Thakor (1987) develop a theory of optimal capital structure based on corporate taxes and informational asymmetries, and then use this theory to explain the choice of PF as an organizational form. In their model, some project values are maximized with separate incorporation (project financing)-and these will have systematically higher leverage ratios than will conventionally-financed projects-because creditors incur lower screening costs in evaluating separately-incorporated project cash flows.
In contrast to Shah and Thakor, Chemmanur and John (1996) develop a symmetric information model of project finance choice that is driven by considerations of the benefits of corporate control. They assert that the control benefits of a particular project are a function of its operating characteristics, and predict that an entrepreneur will seek to maximize the sum of the present value of control benefits (which cannot be contracted away) and security benefits (which can). They then specify the determinants of the optimal organizational choice as a function of firm size, the entrepreneur's ability in managing the specific project (versus other projects under her control), and the level of control benefits and the rate they decline with increasing levels of debt. Generally, the project with the smaller control benefits per dollar of value will be structured as project finance (separately incorporated), and will be allocated a higher debt ratio. Chemmanur (1997) also develops a theory of project finance, but his model explains separate incorporation primarily as an attempt by firms to protect the credit rating of the parent firm, since financing projects through separate subsidiaries may serve to minimize reputation spill-over effects from an ancillary activity.
Several other streams of theoretical research address other characteristics of project finance, besides the distinctive separate incorporation feature. Numerous recent theoretical breakthroughs in the analysis of secured debt financing, the maturity structure of debt contracts, the choice between private debt (bank loans) and public debt (bonds and notes), the role of covenants and collateral in debt contracts, the optimal design of securities, and the monitoring role of financial intermediaries have all yielded important insights about the observed structure of project finance loans. While an in-depth analysis of this literature is beyond our scope here, key articles include secured debt financing studies by Berkovitch and Kim (1990) and Habib and Johnson (1999) ; theoretical and empirical analyses of debt maturity structure by Diamond (1991a Diamond ( , 1993 , Barclay and Smith (1995) , and Guedes and Opler (1996) ; analyses of the choice between privately and publicly-placed debt presented in Diamond (1991b) , Rajan (1992) , Chemmanur and Fulghieri (1994) , Houston and James (1996) , and Repullo and Suarez (1998) ; theoretical and empirical studies of covenant and collateral usage by Smith and Warner (1979) , Berger and Udell (1990) , El-Gazzar and Pastena (1990) , and Rajan and Winton (1995) ; theoretical models of optimal security design presented in Boot and Thakor (1993) , Boyd and Smith (1994) , and Harris and Raviv (1995) ; and financial intermediation papers by Diamond (1984 Diamond ( , 1989 , Allen (1990) , Bizer and DeMarzo (1992) , Johnson (1997) , and Allen and Santomero (1998).
The studies cited above collectively help explain several of the stylized facts about project finance presented in three excellent practitioner-oriented overviews by Kensinger and Martin (1988) , Smith and Walter (1990), and Brealey, Cooper, and Habib (1996) . These commentators assert that PF will most commonly be used for capital-intensive projects, with relatively transparent cash flows, in riskier-thanaverage countries, using relatively long-term financing, and employing far more detailed loan covenants than will conventionally-financed projects. Brealey, Cooper, and Habib also stress that one of the key comparative advantages of project finance is that it allows the allocation of specific project risks (i.e., completion and operating risk, revenue and price risk, and the risk of political interference or expropriation) to those parties best able to manage them. 2 To our knowledge, however, no full-scale empirical study of project finance has yet been published--apart from Kleimeier and Megginson (1998) , who compare PF in Asia with that in the West. Our paper seeks to remedy this gap in the literature.
Specifically, our study has three principal objectives. The first is descriptive. Using a comprehensive sample of over 90,000 syndicated loans (worth over $13 trillion) booked on international capital markets since 1980, we compare the financial characteristics and geographic and industrial distributions of 4,956 PF loans with various non-PF loan sub-samples and with the full sample of all syndicated loans. Second, we perform OLS regression analyses of the determinants of loan pricing (spreads)
for PF and non-PF loans both to determine if PF and non-PF loans are priced in a single integrated market, and to study how borrower and loan-specific factors influence credit spreads. Finally, we estimate an organizational choice model using probit and logit regression techniques, and then apply this to a hold-out sample of loans to determine whether we can predict the choice between traditional and project finance based on observable loan characteristics. We focus this analysis on those industries where PF is used most frequently in order to neutralize as much as possible the influence of asset characteristics and the operating environment on the project financing choice.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the Loanware database used in this study, and also analyzes the industrial and geographic patterns observed for PF versus non-PF lending. The 25 largest project finance deals arranged since 1980 are also described here. In section 3 the financial characteristics of PF loans are compared to the population of all syndicated loans, as well as to four non-PF loan sub-samples. Univariate tests of significant differences between the PF and non-PF loan samples are also presented here. Section 4 presents our separate loan pricing regression analyses of the PF and non-PF loan samples, and tests whether these loans are funded and priced in a single integrated market or in segmented markets. More in-depth pricing analyses of the main PF sample, plus several sub-samples created based on data availability, are presented in section 5. Our organizational choice (logit and probit regression) models are discussed and applied in section 6, and section 7 concludes the study.
The Loanware database
The principal data source used in this study is the Loanware database provided by Capital DATA, a
London-based joint venture company between Euromoney plc and Computasoft Ltd. This database contains detailed historical information on virtually the entire population of syndicated loans and related banking instruments that are booked on national and international capital markets from January 1, 1980 through March 23, 1999. 3 While the file contains information on both signed and unsigned loans, we examine only loans that are actually agreed-to by the contracting parties (signed loans), though we do include the roughly one-eighth of all loans that are subsequently canceled. We also require that the loan size (in $US millions) be available. After applying these two screens, we are able to examine a total of 90,784 loans (worth $13.2 trillion), of which 4,956 loans (worth $634.4 billion) have a loan purpose code of Project Finance. We verify with Capital DATA that this screen refers to loans made to a vehicle company, so we refer to this as our "full project finance loan sample," while we call the larger dataset our "all syndicated loan sample."
The industrial and geographic distribution of project finance loans
The full project finance and all syndicated loan samples are described in Tables 1 and 2. Table 1 presents the industrial distribution of the full sample of all loans and the project finance sample, while Table   2 presents the geographic distribution of both loan samples. Both tables reveal striking differences between project finance lending and more traditional syndicated lending, and these differences largely verify the standard picture that is drawn about project finance. Table 1 shows that PF loans are highly concentrated in five key industries, whereas the general population of syndicated loans reveals a far less concentrated industrial pattern. No less than 60.2 percent of all project lending (by value) and 46.3 percent of all PF loans are made to borrowers in the communications, mining and natural resources, oil and gas, electricity and energy utility, and transportation (excluding airlines and shipping) industries. These industries account for only 21.8 percent of all syndicated lending (value) and a mere 17.1 percent of all syndicated loans. This finding is consistent with the received wisdom that project finance is used primarily to fund tangible-assetrich and capital intensive projects with relatively transparent (often hard-currency) cash flows. This conclusion is reinforced by the observation that all of the other "over-represented" industries for PF lending (i.e., construction/heavy engineering, hotels and leisure, petrochemicals) can be described similarly.
**** Insert Tables 1 & 2 about here **** percent of the number) of all syndicated lending. Closer analysis reveals that PF lending to south-east Asia peaked in 1996, and has fallen dramatically since then, but this region was the heart and soul of PF lending for almost a decade prior to that date-with Indonesia and China being the two favorite target countries.
Intriguingly, U.K. borrowers are more heavily represented in the PF sample than in the full syndicated loan sample (14.5 percent by value versus 9.3 percent), although the rest of western Europe accounts for an almost identical fraction (10.3 versus 10.4 percent) of both types of lending. This preference of project finance lenders for British borrowers is not merely an artifact of the disproportionately large Eurotunnel loans (discussed below). It also reflects the emphasis placed by the Conservative Thatcher and Major governments (and now the Labor government of Tony Blair) on the private rather than public financing of large infrastructure projects-many of which have proven to be remarkably successful, both financially and operationally. As a whole, these geographic lending patterns are consistent with the widely held belief that project finance is a particularly appropriate method of funding projects in relatively risky (non-OECD) countries. Table 3 about here **** Perhaps the most telling difference between the large PF loans detailed in Table 3 and more traditional syndicated credits is the use to which they are put. Whereas (as we will discuss in detail below) most non-PF loans are arranged to finance acquisitions or LBOs, for refinancing existing financing facilities, or for general corporate purposes, all of the large PF loan packages are associated with specific construction projects--though three are refinancing of earlier credits. No less than seven of these involve telecommunications projects, with five being arranged to finance the rollout of mobile phone networks. An additional five packages are arranged to build rail, tunnel, or subway projects, while four are dedicated to constructing electrical utility or cogeneration facilities. Four of the remaining loan packages are allocated to petrochemical projects, and two are arranged to finance the construction of cross-border natural gas pipelines.
Characteristics of the largest project finance deals
Once again, the received wisdom regarding project finance rings true: at least the largest such loan packages are complex, international financial deals involving a vehicle company owned by multiple sponsors, and are arranged to fund development of large, tangible-asset-based projects. The loans are often guaranteed by third parties (though the entire package rarely is-only individual loan tranches), and the projects are often located in relatively risky countries. We now turn to a direct comparison of PF loans with various subsamples of non-PF loans, categorized by their intended use.
Financial characteristics of project finance versus non-project finance loans
Panel A of Table 4 reveals striking-and highly significant--differences both between PF and non-PF loans, as well as between the various categories of traditional loans. One of the most dramatic findings is how much larger are corporate control and capital structure loans than other loan types. These credits have mean These relative size differences remain even when size is expressed as the total value of all loan tranches rather than as individual loans. While the size difference between PF and corporate control loans can be explained away by stressing that the latter involves purchasing an entire company, the fact remains that PF loans are not abnormally large financing vehicles-but rather fall well within the mainstream of syndicated lending.
According to all four of the remaining variables in percent of project finance lending. The only other category of loans with a similar non-U.S. flavor are the fixed asset based credits, which we will find share many important characteristics with PF loans.
Loan pricing samples
One of the most important objectives of this study is to determine whether PF loans are more or less expensive for borrowers than are other types of loans. To address this issue, we select from the sample of all syndicated loans those credits which are both priced as floating rate loans and which use LIBOR as a base interest rate. We also screen for complete data on borrower nationality and loan currency denomination.
These screens yield a set of "high-information" loan samples with comparable pricing data expressed, in basis points, as spreads above LIBOR. These are presented in Panel B of Table 4 average loan size, maturity, and frequency of U.S. borrowers. The same is true for the other loan type subsamples, so we will assume that any empirical results derived from the high-information sub-samples are 6 After LIBOR, the next most common bases for pricing project finance loans are the Singapore and Hong Kong InterBank Offered Rates (SIBOR and HIBOR), with 118 and 82 loans, respectively. A surprisingly large number of 1,830 PF loans list a spread, in basis points (thus confirming they are floating rate credits), but do not specify the base against which the loan is priced. Running our main analyses with these classified as LIBOR-based loans yields qualitatively similar results.
generalizeable to the larger population of all loans.
In addition to the variables discussed earlier, Table 4 's Panel B presents several new loan structure variables as well as greater detail about borrowers and the use for which a loan is arranged. Most of these are self-explanatory (i.e., fee levels, number of banks in a syndicate, loans with guarantees), but a few require definition. We define a loan as having currency risk if the denomination of the loan (and its currency of repayment) differs from the currency of the borrower's home country. Thus a Japanese borrower arranging a dollar loan would be subject to currency risk, whereas that same borrower arranging a yen-denominated loan would not be. Country risk rank and country risk score are taken directly from the semi-annual country risk tabulation in Euromoney magazine. A low-risk country will have a very low rank but a very high score. For example, Luxembourg and the United States were ranked 1 and 2 in late 1998 (Switzerland also typically ranks very high), but Luxembourg's score was 98.9 and the U.S.' score was 97.85. On the other hand, extremely risky countries have high rankings and low scores (in late 1998, North Korea and Afghanistan had rankings of 179 and 180, respectively, and scores of 2.25 and 2.01). While we report both risk rank and risk scores in Panel B, in the interest of space we will subsequently report only empirical results using country risk rank data, since this is the only risk measure reported by Euromoney during the 1980-1982 period. As will be discussed more fully below, rank also has econometric advantages in the loan pricing regressions, since it assigns an increasing value to countries with higher risk-which is also how spreads should be correlated with risk. In all cases, the results using country risk score are qualitatively similar, though the regression intercepts differ substantially.
The variable loans with covenants indicates whether the loan agreement legally imposes any of the standard positive or negative covenants on the borrower. Since this variable suffers from a missing value problem (an empty cell may mean that the loan has no covenants or that the data is unavailable), we report it simply as the fraction of each loan type with covenants included. Finally, the variable loans to collateralizeable asset-rich borrowers is a dummy variable coded as 1 if the borrower is operating in an industry generally believed to be rich in non-specialized, tangible (and thus collateralizeable) assets.
Specifically, this means that the loan recipient has a business borrower code of airlines, apartment management, electricity utility, hotels and leisure, property, REIT, or shipping. Both the theoretical and empirical capital structure literature (see especially Bradley, Jarrell, and Kim (1984) ) indicates that companies with many such assets should be able to tolerate heavier debt levels than other companies. Panel C
of Table 4 The observed level of loan fees and the number of participating banks do provide indirect evidence that PF lending may well be considered relatively more risky than other types of lending-or at least more difficult to arrange. The average levels of commitment and participation fees for PF loans (36.9 and 56.3 bp, respectively) are significantly higher than the levels for the full sample of syndicated loans (30.8 and 36.9 bp), as well as for every sub-sample except corporate control loans. Additionally, the average number of banks participating in PF loans (14.5 banks) is significantly larger than the average for all loans (10.7 banks) and the average for every other loan sub-sample. These findings suggest that banks must be compensated with relatively high up-front fee payments to entice them to participate in project finance lending, and they are apparently unwilling to take as large a stake in PF loans as they would in other credits. Either that or they wish to increase the number of banks participating in a PF credit of a given size in order to spread risks over a larger number of banks for some other reason, such as to build political support. We will examine loan pricing more fully in the next section, when we employ OLS regression to determine what factors influence loan spreads.
Most of the non-price variables detailed in Panel B clearly suggest that PF loans are often similar to fixed asset based loans (FAB), but are otherwise fundamentally different financial instruments from other loan types. As before, a far lower fraction of both PF and FAB loans are arranged for U.S. borrowers (11.6
and 13.4 percent) than is true for the overall sample of all syndicated loans (56.9 percent), and these loans also have much longer average maturity (8.6 and 7.7 years versus 4.8 years). Additionally, PF and FAB loans are much more likely to be subject to currency risk than are other loan types (72.9 and 71.0 percent for PF and FAB loans, respectively, versus 33.1 percent for all syndicated loans). Given the non-U.S. nature of typical PF and FAB borrowers, coupled with the fact that syndicated loans are overwhelmingly dollardenominated, this high level of currency risk is not surprising. Furthermore, a significantly larger fraction of PF and FAB loans carry third-party guarantees (34.1 and 34.5 percent, respectively) than of the full sample of all syndicated loans (13.3 percent) or any other sub-sample.
PF and FAB loans share one other intriguing (and surprising) common feature--they are far less likely to contain loan covenants than are all other loan types. Only 3.4 percent of PF loans, and 7.1 percent of FAB loans, have at least one positive or negative loan covenant versus 30.5 percent of all syndicated credits and 42.4 percent of capital structure loans. We are frankly at a loss to explain why FAB loans have so few covenants-unless these are primarily mortgages, specifically tied to individual assets, which give creditors senior enough positions not to require separate loan covenants. We can, however, offer two possible explanations for the absence of covenants for project finance loans-which received wisdom suggests should be loaded with exquisitely detailed contractual provisions. First, since this database details PF loans, rather than the full financial deals themselves, it is likely that the explicit debt covenants for project finance packages are covered by a separate contract (the project financing package), so the PF loans themselves are simply one part of a much larger deal. No such separate contract governs a takeover loan or a debt refinancing credit extended to an operating company, however, so in those cases the covenants are included in the loans themselves. The second hypothesis really has greater implications for general corporate finance than for a project finance study, though the separate incorporation feature of PF is central to its logic. Since loan covenants are designed in part to protect the creditor from asset substitution and other methods of wealth expropriation by the borrower, it follows that these clauses are far less necessary for loans to a specialpurpose vehicle company than they are for loans made to a complex, multi-divisional corporation. Perhaps one reason PF loans can be made to relatively risky borrowers is because they are much more likely to be arranged for collateralizeable asset-rich projects than is the case for the average syndicated loan. Over one-quarter (27.7 percent) of PF loans are extended for such projects, versus only 14.2 percent of all syndicated loans. On the other hand, the fraction of FAB loans arranged for this type of borrower, 69.5 percent, is the highest of any loan category-which is not surprising since this category was defined to be tangible asset rich.
Before proceeding to a multivariate regression analysis of loan pricing, we should briefly summarize the results of our univariate comparisons between PF loans and other loan types. Project finance loans fall, on average, in the middle range of all syndicated lending in terms of size and loan spread (price). On the other hand, PF loans have much longer average maturity and are more likely to be fixed rather than floating rate credits (and are less likely to be priced relative to LIBOR if they are floating rate). American companies use project finance only sparingly; whereas over half of all syndicated loans are arranged for U.S. borrowers, only one-eighth of PF loans are booked for American vehicle companies. In fact, the average PF loan borrower resides in a much riskier country than is true for syndicated lending in general, and PF lending is significantly more likely to be arranged for a tangible asset rich project. Finally, PF loans share many similarities with fixed asset based credits-such as borrower nationality, average loan size and maturity, frequent use of third-party guarantees, and infrequent use of loan covenants. On the other hand, they also differ in being more expensive than FAB loans and in being extended to relatively riskier, and less tangibleasset rich borrowers.
Loan pricing regression analyses
In this section, we subject the various high-information loan samples detailed in Table 4 , Panel B to OLS regression analysis. Our purposes in doing this are three-fold. First, we wish to determine which of the variables detailed in Table 4 have significant, independent influences on loan spreads once the effects of other variables are accounted for. Second, we wish to determine whether the several categories of loans are priced in the same way-whether the coefficient values and number of significant factors is the same between all of the groups. This is equivalent to testing whether these different loan types are priced in segmented or integrated capital markets. Finally, we wish to determine whether PF loans are more or less expensive than other types of loans-again, after accounting for other factors.
The academic literature contains numerous examples of loan pricing studies, using both bank loans and publicly-traded debt. Theoretical pricing models are presented in Merton (1984) , Black and Cox (1976) , Eaton, Gersovitz, and Stiglitz (1986) , Maksimovic (1990) , Longstaff and Schwartz (1995) , and Duffee (1998). Empirical pricing studies include Smith (1980) , Edwards (1984 Edwards ( , 1986 , Melnik and Plaut (1986) , Scott and Smith (1986) , Berger and Udell (1990) , Boehmer and Megginson (1990 ), Booth (1992 ), Petersen and Rajan (1994 ), and Blackwell and Winters (1997 . 7 The loan pricing tests we perform are most similar to those presented in Booth (1992), both in the actual model estimated and in the average size of loans under examination. Our sample size is, however, many times larger than in Booth or almost any other study cited above.
We estimate the determinants of loan pricing using the model described in equation 1. The dependent variable is the loan spread above LIBOR, in basis points, and the independent variables are those presented and discussed in Table 4 . We employ standard OLS regression estimation techniques and adjust for heteroskedasticity using the methodology proposed by White (1980) . The model estimated is: Collateralizeable Assets = Dummy variable taking the value of 1 if the borrower is in an industry generally considered to be rich in collateralizeable (tangible, non-specialized) assets, and 0 otherwise.
We employ country risk rank as our measure of country risk, rather than risk score, both because this yields two additional years of data, and because this measure increases with country risk--which lends itself to a more logical interpretation of the coefficient on the risk variable coefficient. For example, if rank's coefficient value is 1.50, this implies that a loan booked to a borrower in a country with a risk ranking of 40 will on average have a spread 15 basis points higher than a loan to a borrower in a country with a rank of 30.
We should also explicitly state that this model does not have a variable measuring credit risk in any direct way--such as borrower solvency, liquidity, or leverage ratios-despite the likelihood that such a proxy would prove very useful. There are two reasons for this. First, the Loanware database does not provide a machine readable identification code (i.e., CUSIP or Datastream identification number) for borrowers, so there is no feasible method of matching borrowers to their corresponding accounting or stock price data.
Second, it is not at all clear that debt or liquidity ratios for PF borrowers would be comparable to similar ratios for borrowers of other syndicated loans. Whereas the borrower of all other types of syndicated credits is usually an operating company, which promises its entire faith and credit to repayment of the loan, the PF borrower is, by definition, a vehicle company without external assets or sources of repayment. Thus the implied corporate backing for a syndicated loan to, say, Enron is fundamentally stronger than the backing for a loan to a vehicle company being sponsored by Enron-even if Enron is the sole project sponsor. Other things equal, this lack of corporate guarantee of loan repayment should make these loans riskier and thus more expensive than other types of loans. The key question we hope to answer is whether the project financing structure is sufficiently good at overcoming agency problems, and/or at reducing contract (1994a,c) , Mody and Patro (1995) ).
monitoring and enforcement costs, to overcome this lack of corporate backing. If so, PF loans will not be more expensive than other loan categories-and may even have lower spreads. Table 5 about here ****
The second line of Table 5 details the influence of loan size on spreads, which is insignificant for project finance but negative and significant for all other loan samples. The coefficient values for size on non-PF loans ranges from -0.02 to -0.06, with a weighted average of around -0.05. This suggests that increasing the size of a non-PF syndicated loan by $100 million will reduce the required loan spread by an average of 5 basis points. This negative size/spread relationship could be due to economies of scale in arranging non-PF syndicated credits, or it could be due to better known and more creditworthy borrowers being able to arrange larger loans. Since size is not a significant influence on PF loan prices, we do not attempt a further analysis here. Clearly, however, this finding merits further study.
Loan term is a second variable that behaves differently for project finance than for any other loan type. Whereas spread and maturity are significantly, positively related for all other loan categories, they have a significant negative relationship for PF loans. The coefficient value for term indicates that booking a loan with an original maturity one year longer than the median reduces the average project finance loan spread by 0.89 basis points. A one year increase in maturity would increase spreads for other loan categories--by up to 9.1 basis points for corporate control loans. Since PF loans have an average (and median) maturity that is more than twice that of most other loan types, this result is readily explainable (without a negative spread/term relationship, long tenor loans would be prohibitively expensive), though still surprising.
While finding a consistently significant, negative relationship between spread and guarantee across all loan samples is not surprising, the dispersion in coefficient values definitely is. Whereas the presence of a third-party guarantee reduces the spread on a typical capital structure loan by only 3.7 basis points, a similar guarantee reduces the spread on project finance loans by almost 43 basis points. No other loan category has nearly this sensitivity to third-party guarantees; the next highest value, -19.6 basis points for corporate control, is less than half as large. This result also shows why PF borrowers are so much more willing than are most other borrowers to incur the cost (in time, effort, and cash) required to arrange guarantees. The payoff, in terms of a reduced loan price, is much larger.
In yet another surprise, the currency risk dummy has a significantly negative relationship with loan spreads for every loan category. This finding suggests that a mismatch in the currency of the borrower's home country and the currency of loan repayment significantly reduces the rate charged on an average loan--by 42 basis points for PF credits and by up to 99 basis points for general corporate purpose loans. One obvious interpretation of this is that banks offer lower rates to international borrowers who are willing to accept the risk of borrowing in dollars or another hard currency, though it is not clear why this would not be offset by increasing borrower default risk.
An alternative, more intriguing, explanation for the negative spread/currency risk relationship is that it might be the result of a yield premium charged to U.S. borrowers. Various empirical permutations of this database consistently yield the result that American corporate borrowers pay higher rates for loans of a given size, maturity, and purpose than do non-U.S. borrowers. We can offer three possible explanations for this U.S yield premium. First, it could be that more American corporations have access to the syndicated loan market than do companies from other countries-implying that the average credit rating of US borrowers will be lower. Second, it could be that a larger fraction of U.S. than non-U.S. syndicated lending is for takeover financing, which as we've shown is on average larger and carries a higher spread than does any other type of loan. This type of lending may also offer banks higher spreads because of the corporate borrower's need to arrange large credit lines both rapidly and discretely. The third possible explanation is that there are institutional features (inadequate competition, increased litigation risk, greater compliance costs, etc.) of the syndicated loan market in the United States that act to increase loan rates charged to all American corporate borrowers relative to rates charged to non-U.S. borrowers. This finding also merits more in-depth analysis than we can provide here.
The final variable in Table 5 , collateralizeable assets, is always significant-though it has a negative relationship with spread for corporate control, general corporate purpose, and capital structure loans, and a positive relationship with spreads for PF and FAB credits. This means that, for most loans, a borrower in a collateralizeable asset-rich industry will be charged a lower interest rate than will borrowers in other industries, but the reverse is true (with roughly equal force) for project finance and FAB lending. The negative coefficient for most loans is what we expected-tangible assets should generally support debt better than other types of assets. The positive relationship for PF and FAB could have two explanations. First, it could result from the fact that these types of loans are already concentrated upon funding tangible asset-rich projects, and that the specific industries chosen as "collateralizeable" happen to be relatively riskier than average. Alternatively, it may simply be that riskier projects can be funded using PF or FAB loans than could otherwise be arranged. This is consistent with other loan pricing studies which document that the use of collateral is positively related to loan spreads (Berger and Udell (1990), Booth (1992) , and Blackwell and Winters (1997)). We examine this further below for PF loans. regression of a sample of all loans. Instead, the next section will focus exclusively on PF loans, as we examine the influence of borrower nationality, covenant usage, loan fees, credit risk ratings, and (project) leverage on PF loan pricing.
Panel B of

Determinants of project finance loan pricing
The Loanware database provides varying amounts of information about project finance credits, depending upon factors such as loan size, nationality of borrower, and especially the date the loan is signed.
Larger and more recent loans typically have complete information on all of the variables used thus far in our pricing regressions, plus information on covenant usage, fee levels, and borrower (vehicle company) credit rating, whereas smaller and older loans tend to have much less detailed data. Virtually all PF loans booked since 1994 also provide total project size (in US$ millions), which allows computation of a leverage ratio-at least a measure of the total value of all the PF loan tranches divided by project size. Rather than restrict ourselves to analyzing a single sample with all of this information available (which would yield a sample size of less than 100 loans), we study four different PF loan samples, grouped based on the availability of key data items. These samples are described in Table 6 . **** Insert Table 6 about here ****
Determinants of spreads for the high-information project finance loan sample
Columns 1 through 6 of Table 6 present expanded loan pricing results for the full-information sample of 1803 PF loans, using the same variables as in Table 5 indicating that lending to a borrower with a rank of 30 versus one with a rank of 20 will increase loan spreads by between 11.7 and 15.2 basis points. All of these results are reassuringly similar to those documented earlier in Table 5 , so it is clear that simply adding the covenant usage variable to all six regressions does not fundamentally alter the loan pricing results. Insertion of at least one covenant in a credit, however, does significantly increase PF loan spreads (by between 51.1 and 73.5 basis points). The most logical interpretation of this result is that covenants are added to PF loans, as opposed to the detailed covenants included in the supporting project financing credit packages, only for the most risky credits. Since covenants are observed in only 3 percent of PF loans, their use has a magnified impact on spreads.
Not surprisingly, given the high correlation between the three country and currency risk variables, interpreting the separate effects of currency risk and the US dummy variable is rather problematic. We have seen that country risk rank is consistently and significantly positive-with a stable coefficient value-whenever employed. However, currency risk is significantly positive in two regressions and significantly negative in two others, while the US dummy variable is only significant (positive) in one of three regressions.
Our conclusion regarding the impact of these variables must therefore be tempered. Nonetheless, a comparison of columns 1 and 5 and columns 3 and 6 indicates that the presence of multicollinearity between country risk rank and currency risk seems to be causing a switch in the currency risk coefficient between the two sets of regressions. This suggests that the currency risk dummy is best interpreted when it is reported in regressions excluding country risk rank and US borrower dummy. In these regression, as reported in columns 3, 8, 10, and 12, currency risk -when priced -has a positive impact on spreads. Furthermore, column 1's regression suggests that US borrowers must pay a 26.8 basis point premium over what borrowers from other countries are charged for otherwise similar project finance loans.
The impact of fees on loan pricing
Columns 7 and 8 of Table 6 present the results of our loan pricing regressions for a sub-sample of 661 loans with complete fee information. These two regressions examine whether loan spreads and fees are complements or substitutes. In both cases, the coefficients on the (maximum) participation fee and initial commitment fee variables are significantly positive, suggesting that fees and spreads are complements. On average, each additional basis point increase in the maximum participation fee increases the loan spread by 0.53 bp, while each additional basis point of initial commitment fee increases the spread by 1.22 bp. The most logical interpretation of these findings is that banks are enticed to participate in riskier loans by being offered both higher fees and higher spreads. Not surprisingly, including fees in the regression also significantly reduces the regression intercept, though it remains significantly positive in both regressions.
These regressions also have by far the highest explanatory power (adjusted R 2 values of 0.40) of any of the estimations presented in Table 6 .
With the exception of loan size, all of the other variables in the fee sample regressions have the same sign as in the full-information loan regressions (columns 1-6 of Table 6 ), though maturity is now significantly negatively related to spread (as it was in Table 5 ). The coefficient on loan size, however, is significantly positively related to spread, though the coefficients on this variable in columns 7 and 8 indicate that increasing loan size by $100 million will increase spreads by an average of only 0.6 basis point.
The impact of credit risk on loan spreads
As mentioned earlier, it is extremely difficult to generate standard leverage, liquidity, and solvency measures for project finance loans. This is both because the Loanware database does not provide a machinereadable borrower code that would allow matching of loan data with company-specific accounting information from other databases and because the stand-alone structure of a project finance vehicle company renders its indebtedness measures non-comparable to those of an operating company. We can, however, generate internally consistent solvency and leverage ratios for two sub-samples of project finance loans.
First, columns 9 and 10 of Loanware includes four fields that can be used to measure a borrower's credit rating. These are the Moody's and S&P ratings for the (overall) vehicle company, plus the separate Moody's and S&P ratings for the company's long-term debt. In order to maintain as large a sample as possible, we include all loans that contain at least one rating from any of these four possible rating fields. For loans with more than one rating, the average of all ratings is used. In order to convert the rating Aaa1, Aaa2, Aaa3, Aa1, Aa2, etc into a number, the ratings are ranked and a better rating receives a lower number. Thus, the higher the number, the riskier the loan. For example: Aaa1= 0.75, Aaa2 = 1.00, Aaa3 = 1.25, etc for Moody's rating. For S&P's rating, AAA+ = 0.75, AAA = 1.00, AAA-= 1.25, etc. This coding of the variable borrower rating implies that it will have a positive coefficient, since the higher the rating (the higher the default risk/credit risk of the borrower) the higher the number coded for the borrower rating variable and the higher the spread.
The loan pricing regressions for the ratings sub-sample, presented in columns 9 and 10 of Table 6, show exactly the results expected. A one unit increase in credit risk rating (corresponding to a change from, say, AAA to BBB) is associated with a significant 30.1 to 34.1 basis point increase in a loan's spread. Note also that inclusion of a direct measure of credit risk has a dramatic impact on the regression intercept, causing it to become significantly negative in both regressions (with an average value of -58 bp). The coefficients on loan size and loan term are both insignificant, while covenant usage, lending to a collateralizeable asset-rich borrower, and country risk rank all remain significantly positively related to spread. As always, the presence of a third-party guarantee significantly reduces a loan's price, but both the US dummy variable and the currency risk measure are insignificant. Each of these regressions explains a non-trivial fraction of the total variation in observed loan spreads, yielding adjusted R 2 values of 0.31 and 0.34, respectively.
The final two columns of Table 6 Incorporating a direct leverage measure into the loan pricing regressions once again causes the two intercepts to have significant positive values-though the difference between the two intercepts, almost 42 basis points, is uncomfortably large (45.7 bp versus 87.6 bp). As has frequently been the case, loan size and term are insignificantly related to spread, while the coefficient on country risk rank remains significant and positive and that on guarantee is still significantly negative. For the first time, both the collateralizeable asset and covenant usage variables' coefficients are insignificant, as is currency risk in the more extensive model (when it is included along with rank and the US dummy). Also in this model, the US dummy variable is significantly positive, implying that an American project would be charged a rate 51.9 basis point higher than an otherwise similar project located elsewhere.
Estimating an organizational choice model of project finance lending
We conclude our empirical analysis of project finance lending by examining whether it is possible to predict when project finance lending will be used to fund specific projects. In order to focus on the variables that we have, and also to finesse the influence of industry and investment opportunity set on the organizational structure choice, we examine only PF and non-PF loans made to borrowers in industries with at least 100 project finance loans. We thus examine whether it is possible to predict if a particular loan made to a borrower in, say, the oil and gas industry will be structured as a PF loan rather than as a straight syndicated credit, based only on country risk factors and specific characteristics of the loan itself (maturity, size, presence of a guarantee, etc.). We analyze the choice between project finance and non-project finance lending with both logit and probit regression techniques, using a dummy variable coded as 1 if the loan is a project finance loan and zero otherwise. The model we estimate is presented very generally in equation 2 below, along with the empirical variables employed:
Probability [Y=1] = F (size, maturity, country risk, currency risk, guarantee)
All variables are the same as defined in equation 1, except that we use both country risk measures-rank and score-in separate model estimations for both the logit and probit regressions. Therefore, country risk is measured by rank in the first regression, but is measured by score in the second regression. Since loan spread is not a variable in this model, the peculiar way that country risk score expresses risk (a higher score means lower risk) will not cause difficulties in interpreting the estimation results. The coefficient on the risk variable is simply expected to have a negative value for score and a positive value when rank is used.
The probit and logit regressions differ in the assumption each makes regarding the underlying distribution. Whereas a logit regression assumes a logistic distribution, a probit assumes a normal distribution. As Greene (1990) states, the choice between probit and logit is difficult to justify theoretically and both approaches generally lead to similar results. Thus, both models are presented in table 7.
The sample used to estimate our organizational choice model includes all loans in the Loanware database with complete information regarding loan size in US$ millions, loan maturity, loan currency, borrower nationality, and date of signing. An additional screen requires that the borrower be from an industry that records at least 100 project finance loans during the 1980-1999 study period (see Table 1 for a listing).
From these initial screenings, we retain those loans extended to borrowers based in a country for which either a country risk rank or score is reported in Euromoney in the year the loan is signed. These sample selection criteria result in a sample of 22,911 loans with country risk rank information and 21,928 loans with country risk score information. The difference in sample size is due to the fact that, as mentioned previously, Euromoney reported country risk scores for only a few countries prior to 1983. The PF and non-PF samples created by these screens are qualitatively similar to the samples used in the univariate comparisons and in the loan pricing regressions, though we do not present the sample characteristics in the interest of space. A tabulation of these characteristics is available upon request. **** Insert Table 7 about here **** Our estimation procedure is as follows. First, each sample (one using risk rank, the other using risk score) is sorted randomly. The first 20,000 observations from each sample are then used in the probit and logit regressions, respectively. The results are reported in Panel A of Table 7 . In a second step, an optimal cut-off probability is calculated following the approach developed by Palepu (1986) . This cut-off probability is used to test the out-of-sample predictive power of the model. For the hold-out samples of 2,911 (country risk rank) and 1,928 (country risk score) loans, we then predict that a particular credit will be structured as a project finance loan if its estimated probability--based on the coefficients in Panel A--lies above the cut-off probability. Conversely, a loan is predicted to be non-project finance if its estimated probability lies below the cut-off probability. These out-of-sample predictions are recorded in Panel B of Table 7 .
In addition to the estimated coefficients, Table 7 's Panel A also reports the likelihood ratio index for each regression. This index can be interpreted as a pseudo-R 2 for linear regressions and thus provides information about the explanatory power of the model being estimated. The regression results in Panel A reveal that all variables except the project's size have an influence on the organizational choice. Project finance is chosen for longer-term projects, in riskier countries, which face currency risk and are guaranteed.
These results are the same regardless of the underlying distribution assumed (logit versus probit). Also, the two alternative measures of country risk point in the same direction, though the coefficients have opposite signs. The positive coefficient on the country risk rank indicates that project finance is chosen for higher ranking, thus riskier countries. The country risk score coefficient leads to the same conclusion: Project finance is chosen for projects in countries with lower scores, thus higher risk.
The explanatory power of the model can be evaluated by either looking at the likelihood ratio index, which is 21 or 22 percent for all 4 regressions, or by looking at the predictive power of the models as represented in Panel B of Table 7 . Here, the probit model clearly provides superior results regarding the project finance sub-samples, since 73 percent of all project finance loans and about 80 percent of all nonproject finance loans are correctly predicted using probit regression. Logit provides superior predictive accuracy for non-PF loans, averaging about 90 percent for the two samples, but does so at the cost of correctly predicting the project finance loan choice only 59 percent of the time. Using either probit or logit regression, however, it is worth noting that this simple model correctly predicts the classification of a given loan as either PF or non-PF in almost four out of every five cases.
Summary and conclusions
This study compares the financial characteristics of a large sample of limited recourse project finance loans to a comparison sample of all non-project finance loans, as well as to various sub-samples of non-PF credits classified by loan purpose. Collectively, these samples represent almost the population of large syndicated bank loans booked on international capital markets since 1980-over 90,000 loans in total, with an aggregate value in excess of $13 trillion. We find that project finance (PF) loans differ significantly from non-project finance credits in that PF loans have a longer average maturity, are more likely to have third-party guarantees, and are far more likely to be extended to non-US borrowers and to borrowers in riskier countries.
PF credits also involve more participating banks, have fewer loan covenants, are more likely to use fixed-rate rather than floating-rate loan pricing, and are more likely to be extended to borrowers in tangible-asset-rich industries such as oil and gas, real estate, and electric utilities.
Despite being non-recourse finance, floating-rate PF loans have lower credit spreads (over LIBOR) than do most comparable non-PF loans. This surprising result clearly indicates that the project financing structure solves important agency costs that are inherent in the creditor/borrower relationship, and that PF is a very effective method of providing monitoring for large projects with relatively transparent cash flows. Also contrary to expectations, we find that PF loans are not larger than non-PF loans, but are in fact significantly smaller than corporate control or capital structure loans (two of the four non-PF loan samples examined).
Though PF and (most) non-PF loans are all syndicated bank credits, our univariate comparisons suggest that project finance loans differ rather fundamentally from non-PF credits in almost every important aspect.
The loan pricing regression analyses we perform show econometrically that PF and non-PF credits are in fact different financial instruments. Applying the same pricing estimation model to each loan type reveals that PF and non-PF loans are funded in segmented capital markets, with spreads on PF loans being influenced both by different factors and to different degrees by common factors. PF loan spreads are directly related to borrower country risk, the use of covenants in the loan contract, and project leverage. Spreads are also higher when a borrower is in a tangible -asset-rich industry, while the presence of a third-party guarantee significantly reduces PF loan spreads. Though non-PF loan spreads are negatively related to size, and positively related to maturity, these variables do not significantly influence PF loan pricing in most of our regression analyses. Our finding that PF loan fees are significantly positively related to spreads indicates that fees and spreads are complements, rather than supplements. Other aspects of PF loan syndication patternssuch as a significantly greater number of banks participating in these credits, and much higher fee levels-also suggest that PF loans are relatively more difficult to arrange than non-PF loans, perhaps due to the dramatically higher average level of country risk for PF loans. While direct comparisons of the leverage ratios of project finance vehicle companies and the operating companies that arrange most syndicated loans are not possible, we do find that projects funded with PF loans are indeed heavily leveraged-with an average loan to project value ratio of 67 percent.
We complete our study by applying an organizational choice model (using probit and logit regressions) to a large sample of loans extended to borrowers in those industries which frequently use project finance. We thus test if it is possible to predict whether a given loan extended to a borrower in, say, the airline industry will be structured as a PF or ordinary syndicated credit. Applying our model to two hold-out samples of about 2,000 loans each yields a predictive accuracy of almost 80 percent. Table 3 Financial details of the twenty-five largest project finance deals since 1980 This table provides financing and contracting details regarding the 25 largest total project finance funding packages arranged since 1980. These are listed by the total value of all loans arranged as part of the package, and details of each loan are presented on each line. The launch date is the date the loan is first formally proposed by the lead bank and the borrower. Loan size gives the value of these credit in US$ millions (converted into dollars at the contemporaneous exchange rate, when necessary), and the borrower name is the formal name of the vehicle company arranging the credit. Location refers to the country where the project is located, while the identity of the sponsors is provided in the fifth column, whenever provided in the Loanware database. Term refers to the maturity of each loan, while the column labeled Spread describes a loan's price, expressed as basis points over the London Inter-bank Offered Rate (LIBOR). Third-party loan guarantees, if any, are described in the eighth column, while the purpose of the project finance loan package is described in the final column. Table 6 Regression analyses of the determinants of project finance loan spreads (loan pricing). This table presents the results of an ordinary least squares regression analysis of the determinants of loan pricing spreads for the full project finance and for various project finance subsamples created based upon data availability. Columns 1 through 6 analyze the full project finance loan sample, with various combinations of country risk variables added singly and in combination. Columns 7 and 8 examine a sample of project finance loans that also have complete information on the loan fees charged. Columns 9 and 10 examine a sample of loans with credit ratings data, while columns 11 and 12 present regressions of a sample of loans with data on the $US amount of total project size. This allows a leverage measure to be calculated. T-statistics are based on heteroskedasticity robost errors according to White (1980) and reported in parentheses. * indicates that the reported coefficient is not statistically different from zero at the 5% level. Table 7 Organisational Choice between Project Finance and Non-Project Finance Structure This table presents the results of estimating an organizational choice model on two samples of syndicated loans which contain full information regarding loan size, loan maturity, borrower nationality, loan currency, loan guarantee, and either country risk rank or country risk score. The resulting two samples are randomly sorted and the first 20,000 observations are used for the regression analysis in panel A, whereas the remaining observations are used for the out-of-sample prediction reported in Panel B. The objective is to determine if the actual choice of organizational form-project finance versus ordinary loan format-can be predicted based upon observed characteristics of the loan and the borrower. In Panel A, T-statistics are in parentheses. Panel B reports results of the out-of-sample prediction using optimal cut-off probabilities as promoted by Palepu (1986 
